To evaluate the effectiveness of port State measures in combating IUU fishing, this research relied on gaining accurate data on the identity and movements of IUU-listed vessels. The process of gathering this preliminary information in itself revealed significant limitations in the quality and quantity of records provided by the shipping databases, actual port records and fisheries authorities.
The first major finding of our study was the low visibility of the IUU-listed vessels: Their identification and tracking was hindered by insufficient or inaccurate vessel information. The first two sections present the findings for the first stages of the research—creation of the combined IUU-vessel list and the compilation of movement data.
The third section details the analysis of listed vessels’ port State movements around the globe to identify patterns and motives. The last sections present our findings on compliance by port States with existing measures on IUU fishing and analyze the impact on vessel movements when control measures are enforced only regionally.
1. The Combined IUU-Vessel List: A Case of Incomplete Identities
- The first significant finding was that vessel information is insufficient and too inconsistent for identification purposes.
- Sixty percent of vessels on the combined IUU vessel list did not possess an IMO number.
IUU operators tend to disguise their vessels by renaming them and changing their flags and IRCS. The only globally available unique vessel identifier presently available is a vessel’s IMO number. Because fishing vessels, unlike merchant vessels, are not obliged to have an IMO number, vessels on IUU lists do not always have IMO numbers.
Between January 2004 and December 2009, this research identified 178 vessels that appeared on at least one of the IUU lists of the eight RFMOs included in this study. Of these 178 vessels, only 71 (40 percent) were listed with an IMO number. Two of those IMO numbers belonged to other vessels. RFMOs, national fisheries authorities and enforcement authorities on the ground had no IMO numbers for the remaining 107 vessels.
However, our research enabled us to track down and assign an IMO number to 32 of the vessels that did not have an IMO number recorded on RFMO IUU-vessel lists. All except one of these 32 vessels were on the ICCAT or IATTC IUU-vessel lists.
Of the 178 vessels on the combined IUU vessel list, 151 were listed as fishing vessels, 10 were refrigerated transport vessels (“reefers”) and 17 were ‘other vessels’, i.e. either unknown or originally fishing vessels, IUU-listed but then rebuilt to other functions (e.g., military, tugboats, and petroleum supply vessels).
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2. Movement Data of IUU-Listed Vessels: Low or No Visibility
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More than two-thirds of all IUU-listed vessels showed no movement.
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More than half of port visits by IUU-listed vessels were made by reefers.
Recordings of port visits by IUU-listed vessels in publicly available databases were limited. In the period covered by this research, we documented 509 separate vessel movements. Of these, 425 were port visits. Only movements made while the vessels were on the IUU vessel lists were included. Most of the movements (340) were documented by the Lloyd’s MIU database, followed by Sea-web (99), our communications with countries (66), shipspotting.com (20) and in two online port logs (4). 92 movements were documented by more than one source.
The 509 movements were made by just 58 of the 178 vessels on the combined IUU vessel list. Thus, 120 vessels (67 percent) show no publicly available movement record. We consider it unlikely that all 120 vessels ceased operations while they were IUU-listed; it is more likely that most of them have continued to operate without being noticed, not only by the commercial databases used in this study but also by most fisheries and enforcement authorities.
Of the 58 vessels that showed movement during their IUU-listing period, 48 (83 percent) were fishing vessels, eight (14 percent) were reefers and two (3 percent) were other types of vessels. However, reefers made 241 of the 425 total recorded port visits (57 percent).
The higher proportion of port visits by reefers compared with fishing vessels can be explained at least partially by two causes.
- Transport vessels move among ports to load and unload goods, whereas fishing vessels can stay at sea, unloading their fish onto reefers and receiving supplies, such as fuel and crew.
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In contrast to cargo vessels including reefers, fishing vessels are not required to have an IMO number. IMO numbers are linked to records in ship registers (Lloyd’s MIU and Sea-web), where additional vessel information is recorded. Thus, enforcement authorities have better access to information on reefers than on fishing vessels. This explains the higher likelihood that port visits of reefers will be recorded both by enforcement authorities and the commercial databases.
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3. Global Reach of IUU-Listed Vessels
- Port visits of IUU-listed vessels were recorded in all regions of the world.
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More than half of port visits by IUU-listed vessels were to countries under no obligation to enforce port State measures.
Figure 1: Port Visits by IUU-Listed Vessels. Of the 509 different vessel movements, 425 were to 140 ports of 71 countries.
IUU fishing is a worldwide phenomenon, and port visits by IUU-listed vessels by the eight RFMOs were recorded in every region of the world. The 425 port visits were to 140 ports in 71 countries across the five major continents (Figure 1). The remaining 84 movements (of a total of 509) were passages throught the Suez Canal (4) and Panama Canal (45); the strits of Bosporus (8), Malacca (2) and Dardanelles (1); Mexico’s Yucatan Channel (1); and vessels passing surveillance points at Cape Finisterre (10) and Tarifa (5) in Spain; at Port Said (3) in Egypt; and Torbay(1) in the United Kingdom.
The research results show that 55 percent of the documented port visits were to countries that were not Party to the RFMOs that had put these vessels on their IUU lists. This demonstrates the mobility of IUU-listed vessels and underlines the limited effect of port State measures if implemented only regionally. The inclination to stay within or leave the convention area varies for vessels listed on different IUU-vessel lists.
While the distribution of port visits shows the global reach of IUU activities, information from commercial databases alone is not enough to draw firm conclusions on the effectiveness of port State measures. First, if a country has no recorded port visits, it does not mean that there were none. Figure 2 shows that many port visits are not detected by the commercial databases. Second, not every port visit recorded in this research is in violation of port State measures. Countries have varying obligations depending on the RFMO to which they are a Party. Some prohibit port visits altogether, while others prohibit the landing of fish or other commercial transactions. Such information is not typically provided by commercial databases, so information from RFMOs and port States on the purpose and details of the visit has been included in order to determine port State compliance with port State measures. Finally, port visits can trigger port State actions against the vessels and their operators.
Therefore, we integrated information gathered directly from port States and RFMOs, especially on the purposes and details of these visits. We based our assessment of port State compliance on (a) this information and (b) the prevailing obligations of the port State at the time of the visit.
Figure 2: Composition and Visibility of IUU-Listed Vessels. Vessels showing movements are marked in red
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4. Port State Performance: Poor Compliance With Port State Measures Against IUU-Listed Vessels
- Nearly three-quarters of visits by IUU-listed vessels were in violation or potential violation of the port States’ obligations to one or more RFMOs.
- Identification problems, lack of communication among domestic authorities and misinterpretations of port State measures are among the reasons for non-compliance.
The majority of RFMOs do not share their IUU vessel lists. As a result, port States are generally obliged to take enforcement action only against vessels listed by their own RFMOs (see Section 3.6). Countries have different levels of obligations depending on the RFMO(s) to which they are a Party. RFMOs differ in the strength of their port State measures: some require denial of port entry, while others only deny port services and/or landing of fish. Therefore, even if a port entry is not prohibited as such, the port State can still fail to fulfil its obligations. If a port State has failed to declare explicitly in communications with us that it has denied landing of fish products, or whatever the relevant obligations require, for the purposes of this research we have categorised this as a potential violation.
During the research period, 219 of the total port visits by IUU-listed vessels were to States that were CPs of the RFMO that listed the visiting vessel. These visits were made by vessels that carried IMO numbers and could have been identified as IUU-listed by enforcement authorities. Nevertheless, 74 percent of these port visits constituted violations or potential violations of the port State’s obligations under the relevant RFMO’s CMMs. For the assessment of port State compliance, the obligations as stipulated by different RFMOs have to be taken into account.
Of the remaining visits to ports in States that were CPs of RFMOs, 10 percent were subject to confirmed port State actions: some were inspected and fined; others were detained for IUU fishing or sent away from the port or, where appropriate, were refused port services. Another 16 percent of these port visits can be regarded as non-violations for a variety of reasons (e.g., the RFMO CMM does not require that a CP refuse port entry, just the landing or transhipment of fish or provision of other port services; the vessel is in trouble (force majeure); or the visit was related to a port State action taken somewhere else to break or scrap the vessel. Other examples are that the visit occurred before the port State became a CP of the listing RFMO or the port visit was made to a port where the port State measures do not apply, as is the case for Chinese Hong Kong.
From the 22 country responses received, we identified five major reasons for non-compliance.
- Enforcement authorities were not aware of the port visits of the IUU-listed vessel or wrongly identified it. IUU operators can benefit from the neglectful practices of some RFMOs if their vessel’s IMO numbers are not recorded on the RFMO’s IUU vessel list. Japan offers one example of how gaps in documentation and communication were a major reason for the low visibility of IUU-listed vessels, making it difficult for the port State to identify them and take action. The ICCAT IUU-listed fishing vessel Melilla No. 101 was listed without an IMO number. The vessel has an IMO number (added to the combined IUU-vessel list) but later changed its name to Dong Won No. 630. When the vessel visited Shimizu, Japan, in 2006, Japanese authorities had no way of knowing that the vessel was IUU-listed, which was also confirmed by our correspondence with Japan.
- Our correspondence with 22 countries revealed a lack of cooperation between national fisheries authorities and enforcement authorities. These domestic authorities do not consistently share the responsibility and a common understanding of the importance of port State measures against IUU fishing activities to achieve their effective implementation. Only on a few occasions could the fisheries authorities provide all requested information on national policies and on visits made by IUU-listed vessels to their ports. In nearly all cases, regular information exchange processes between relevant bodies were not demonstrated and our requests prompted fisheries authorities to seek information from enforcement authorities. In one case, it was explicitly stated that no notice was received from any national body with regard to IUU-listed vessels or vessels believed to be engaged in IUU activities. This implied that the fisheries authority did not consider itself responsible for failing to have such knowledge and ensuring enforcement of port measures. Yet, their correspondence provided no information on notification procedures from enforcement authorities.
- In a number of examples, the measures adopted by RFMOs have not been fully translated into national law. In some cases, this transitional situation took a long time to resolve, even through the end of the research period, leaving the port State unable to take action against IUU-listed vessels.
- The denial of port access and port services to vessels on an IUU vessel list is subject to broad interpretation by port States. Some countries feel obliged to deny access to any vessel on an IUU vessel list, while others indicate such denial is only required if the vessel, when requesting port access, is carrying fish or fisheries products that have been caught in contravention of CMMs. Japan offers an example of the latter: the NEAFC IUU-listed reefer Polestar was permitted to enter the port of Kobe and landed pumpkins imported from Tonga.
- RFMOs have not been active enough in supporting their CPs in effectively implementing port State measures. They did not generally request information on visits by IUU-listed vessels to the ports of their CPs, nor did they consistently assess the compliance of their Parties with port State measures. Non-compliance was not generally followed by sanctions. In some cases, there were ambiguities over the date that relevant CMMs entered into force, so port States were unclear about their obligations. As it stands, not all RFMOs played an active role in ensuring that port States were held accountable for the effective implementation of port State measures (see RFMO profiles).
On the other hand, there are examples on the effectiveness of port State measures in combating IUU fishing when correctly implemented. Disguising vessels by changing names or hiding IMO numbers does not always dupe authorities. In a case where an IUU operator gave the wrong IMO number to conceal the identity of a vessel, the country (Norway) uncovered the vessel’s true identity and took action: the vessel was made to leave the port.
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5. Regional Focus of Port State Measures: Shifting the Problem
- The regional application of port State measures allows IUU-listed vessels to move to other regions when measures are enforced.
- Percentage of visits to NCPs by NEAFC IUU-listed vessels doubled after stronger enforcement was introduced.
Ambiguities and misinterpretations of port State measures can be eliminated by denying port access instead of merely denying the landing of fish and port services. Further, denying IUU-listed vessels entry to port targets the economic basis of the illegal operations by rendering IUU activities more costly and less attractive.
To assess what effect denial of port entry to IUU-listed vessels may have on the movements of these vessels, the port visits of IUU vessels listed by NEAFC to CPs and NCPs were further analysed (Table 2). This RFMO had already established IUU vessel list at the beginning of the research period (2004-2009), and introduced CMMs requiring the denial of port access i 2007.
NEAFC places great emphasis on reducing IUU fishing: It maintains a comprehensive IUU-vessel list (including good record keeping of IMO numbers); has strengthened port State measures that extend to transport vessels in addition to fishing vessels; and has actively assisted port State actions against IUU-listed vessels. In May 2007, NEAFC adopted a new port State control system, which included a provision that denied NEAFC IUU-listed vessels entry to the ports of its CPs. After its adoption, the proportion of NEAFC IUU-listed vessels visiting ports of States that were not Parties to NEAFC doubled from 42 to 80 percent.
The significant increase in visits by NEAFC IUU-listed vessels to port States that were not bound by the RFMO’s strict port State measures indicated the desired impact of the strengthened port State measures. However, it also illustrated that as long as port State measures remain regional, the problem will simply be shifted elsewhere.
The stories of two prolifically active refrigerated transport vessels, Polestar and Sunny Jane, offer prime examples of this problem. After their inclusion on NEAFC’s IUU-vessel list and subsequently two other RFMO lists, each vessel was subject to a series of port State actions by a number of States, including refusal of entry to several ports, prohibition of landings and detention. Morocco, which was not a NEAFC CP but recognised NEAFC’s IUU-vessel list, was among those States that took action against Polestar. In many instances, however, Polestar and Sunny Jane were able to operate with impunity in regions outside and at times inside the convention areas where they were IUU-listed.
| BEFORE the strengthened measure (denial of port access) entered into force | |
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No. of port visits to CPs
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99
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No. of port visits to NCPs
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72
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Total number of port visits
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171
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Percent of port visits to NCPs
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42%
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AFTER the strengthened measure (denial of port access) entered into force | |
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No. of port visits to CPs
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18
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No. of port visits to NCPs
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84
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Total number of port visits
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102
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Percent of port visits to NCPs
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82%
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Table 2: Port Visits of NEAFC IUU-listed vessels to NEAAFC CPs and NCPs before and after Strengthened Measures Entered Into Force in May 2007
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